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 ABSTRACT  
This paper sets out an improved framework for examining critical junctures.  This 
framework, while rigorous and broadly applicable, already an advance on the 
frameworks currently employed, primarily seeks to incorporate an a priori element.  
Until now the frameworks utilised in examining critical junctures were entirely 
postdictive.  Adding a predictive element to the concept will constitute a significant 
advance.  The new framework, and its predictive element, termed the “differentiating 
factor,” is tested here in examining macro-economic crises, and subsequent changes 
in macro-economic policy, in America and Sweden.     
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Introduction 
Institutionalists (for example, Christensen 1997; Gorges 2001; Mahoney 2000; 
Pierson 2000; Steinmo, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo 1992) have regularly argued that 
crises can result in abrupt institutional change.  Often, crises are pointed to as the 
starting points in a sequence of change, as in path dependence.  Consequently, 
scholars’ interpretations of institutional change have resulted in the past’s division 
into periods of normalcy, and critical junctures. 
But, Pierson (2004: 5-6) argues that critical junctures, ‘a concept needed in 
underpinning the analyses of temporal processes, have received only limited 
discussion.’  Thelen (1999: 388) also points to the lack of sophisticated tools for 
understanding change.  These arguments relate to the idea that historical 
institutionalism, in general, has tended to concentrate on the institutional, rather than 
the historic, side of the approach. 
Of late, historical institutionalists have moved on from critical junctures, 
seeking new means to demonstrate how institutions are remade over time (Clemens 
and Cook, 1999; Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 1999, 2000).  Consequently, the critical 
junctures concept, an only half developed approach as it is entirely postdictive, is 
being consigned to academic history.  Simultaneously, with some scholars declaring 
events to be critical junctures, watersheds, or other turning point terms, without the 
provision of the least evidence, the concept is being rendered meaningless. 
 In the past critical junctures have been examined by means of unwieldy 
frameworks (Collier and Collier 1991), or counterfactual analysis (Fearon, 1991; 
1996).  Of late Hogan (2005; 2006) sought to develop a framework with greater 
rigour.  But, this involved narrow, in many instances case specific, criteria, as well as 
arbitrary standards.  Scholars have yet to develop a framework for examining critical 
 3 
junctures that is rigorous and widely applicable.  All previous approaches have also 
lacked a predictive element.  However, this paper seeks to develop a rigorous, widely 
applicable framework for examining critical junctures, which incorporates a 
predictive element. 
Our hypothesis is: a critical juncture in macro-economic policy consists of 
three stages; macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and radical change in 
economic policy.  The time periods concern rapid changes in macro-economic policy, 
as this is synonymous with the concept of critical junctures.  Through the study of five 
potential macro-economic crises in two countries, the paper will develop a set of a 
priori criteria for examining potential critical junctures.  The reason for so many cases 
is, as Hall (1993: 277) encourages, broad concepts deserve exploration in many 
contexts, and no single case can fully resolve such issues.  The paper will show that 
although there were five potential macro-economic crises not all were actual crises; 
and not all of the actual crises resulted in critical junctures in macro-economic policy. 
The paper will explain what differentiates a macro-economic crisis that results 
in a critical juncture in economic policy from one that does not.  This differentiating 
factor constitutes the essential predictive element.  Once identified, it will be possible 
in future to look at any country experiencing economic difficulties, test to see if these 
difficulties constitute a crisis, test for the differentiating factor’s presence, and then 
declare if there will be a critical juncture in that country’s macro-economic policy.  
This would remove the longstanding element of contingency associated with critical 
junctures by path dependence scholars (Mahoney, 2000: 513), and eliminate the 
necessity of having to wait decades to conclude if an event was a critical juncture.  
Whilst this approach focuses on macro-economic crisis, and its consequences for 
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macro-economic policy, the framework could examine a range of crises and their 
impact on various policies. 
 The first section discusses the critical junctures literature, focusing upon the 
frameworks developed; the range of issues studied, and the concept’s postdictive 
nature.  The second section sets out the countries chosen for examination, and the 
timeframe of study.  The third section sets out and tests criteria for identifying macro-
economic crisis, ideational change, and macro-economic policy change.  The 
conclusion will highlight the findings and significance of the paper. 
 
 
Section 1: The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach 
Critical junctures are seen as constituting the trigger events that set processes of 
institutional, or policy change, in motion.  The literature sees critical junctures 
resulting in the adoption of an institutional arrangement from among alternatives 
(Mahoney, 2000: 512).  Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in a 
particular direction, with the consequence of increasing returns, and resultant 
irreversibilities (Mahoney, 2003: 53; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9).  However, 
Pierson (2004) argues that institutional stability can result from non-path dependent 
causes, implying that critical junctures should not be defined by the assumption that 
they initiate path dependent processes. 
For some, the duration of a critical juncture may involve a brief period, while 
for others it can constitute an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney 2001).  The 
analysis of critical junctures has been influential in comparative politics.  Collier and 
Collier (1991) developed a framework for determining critical junctures in national 
development in Latin America.  Their definition does not imply institutional 
innovation occurs in short episodes (Thelen, 2004: 215).  For Mahoney (2001), 
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analysing the nineteenth century liberalization of Central America, critical junctures 
took decades to come about, while their effects were sometimes of shorter duration.  
Hogan (2005; 2006) questioned whether these periods could be called critical 
junctures, or were instances of incremental change, labelled by Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) as periods of conversion. 
 However, critical junctures have also been employed in research into short 
term change.  Garrett and Lange (1995: 628) showed that electoral landslides create 
critical junctures by producing mandates for policy change.  Casper and Taylor (1996) 
employed critical junctures in analysing when authoritarian regimes were vulnerable 
to liberalization.  Examining the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Haggard 
(1988: 91) argued that economic depression brought into question existing 
institutions, resulting in dramatic change.  Karl (1997) used the concept in analysing 
the “petro-states” problematic development paths; Gal and Bargal (2002) used it to 
analyse occupational welfare in Israeli, while Vargas (2004) used it to examine the 
Chiapas conflict.  Hogan (2005; 2006) remoulded the framework to examine change 
in trade union influence over public policy.    
Critical junctures are regarded as pointing to the importance of the past in 
explaining the present.  They ‘suggest the importance of formative moments for 
institutions and organisations’ (Pierson, 1993: 602).  Consequently, the above studies 
were postdictive.  But, if focusing on the formative moments of institutions is critical, 
only being able to do so retrospectively constitutes a significant weakness for the 
concept, something this paper seeks to remedy. 
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Section 2: The Countries Selected for Examination 
America and Sweden were selected for examination based upon most similar and 
most different criteria.  For most similar we chose the criteria of long-standing 
democracy, and advanced capitalist state.  We utilised Lijphart’s (1999) categories of 
majoritarian and consensual democracies as the ‘most different’ basis for selection, 
allowing us to control for varying institutional arrangements.  Both countries’ 
economies are very different, while their performances, and the policies governing 
them, have varied dramatically.  Thus, their similarities ensure ‘the contexts of 
analysis are analytically equivalent, to a significant degree,’ while their difference 
place ‘parallel processes of change in sharp relief’ (Collier, 1997: 40).  Here we 
examine potential crises from their economic performance between 1945 and 2000. 
 
Section 3.1 The Identification of Macro-economic Crisis 
‘An important part of the literature on critical junctures views them from the 
perspective of crises, placing particular emphasis on the tensions leading up to the 
critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier, 1991: 32).  ‘Traditionally, students of 
institutional change focused on the importance of crisis,’ (Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 
184).  Exogenous shock is often cited as an explanation for policy change (Greener, 
2001; Golob, 2003: 373).  Here the crises being searched for are macro-economic in 
nature.  ‘Most scholars agree that severe recessions make significant structural 
changes possible because they render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett, 1993: 522).  
Governments, political parties, and their economic policies, are openly exposed to the 
impact of economic fluctuations, being readily affected by them.  A macro-economic 
crisis can call into question existing institutions, policies, or even state projects, 
consequently triggering change (Tilly, 1975).   
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Macro-economic crises are rare events rendering definition and identification 
difficult (Yu et al., 2006: 439).  Consequently, how do we identify a macro-economic 
crisis?  This issue relates to the broader concept of how problems move onto the 
policy agenda in the first instance.  Stone (1989: 299) argues that a situation does not 
become a problem until it is seen as amenable to control.  But, if it is controllable it 
must be measurable, otherwise how would we know if we are controlling the 
situation?  Thus, a macro-economic crisis must be quantifiable to some extent.  
Kaminsky et al., (1998) and Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated the use of individual 
variables when quantifying currency crises, a concept equally applicable to macro-
economic crises.  Pei and Adesnik (2000: 138-139) developed a broader range of 
criteria for identifying macro-economic crises: an annual inflation rate greater than 15 
per cent, stagnant or negative annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and 
historians and other analysts’ descriptions of significant deterioration in economic and 
financial circumstances.  For Garuba (2006: 21), Kwon (2001: 105), and Solimano 
(2005: 76) a macro-economic crisis can be seen in general indicators and perceptions 
of growth, inflation, employment creation, poverty reduction, and their combined 
socio-psychological burden on society.  However, unlike Yu et al. (2006), we are not 
seeking to forecast macro-economic crises, merely identify them. 
As Pei and Adesnik (2000: 139) note, defining any macro-economic downturn 
as a crisis requires subjective and objective deliberations.  Consequently, González 
(2005: 93) suggests the adoption of a multifaceted approach, as these are situations in 
which failure is identified and widely perceived (Hay 1999: 324). Agents must 
diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a crisis before collective action to 
resolve uncertainty can take meaningful form (Blyth 2002: 9).  This fits with Hay’s 
(1999: 321) perception of crisis as the triumph of a simplifying ideology.  
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Consequently, we develop a broad range of observable implications, which include, 
and build upon, the objective and subjective criteria of previous studies.  These 
implications accept that a macro-economic crisis must constitute a severe economic 
low point.   
 
Macro-economic Crisis 
The first three observables, largely quantitative in nature, are derived from Pei and 
Adesnik (2000), and Solimano (2005).  However, we employ a lower inflation 
threshold than Pei and Adesnik, as the developed states studied here are not as 
susceptible to severe inflationary fluctuations as their developing counterparts.  
The latter observables are partly derived from Pei and Adesnik’s (2000) 
recommendation to examine historians’, and other analysts’, descriptions of economic 
deterioration to determine if there is a crisis.  However, they also draw upon the work 
of Garuba (2006), Kwon (2001), and Soliman (2005) whose measures for economic 
crisis are more qualitative, and contextual, than quantitative.    
 
O1. If the main economic indicators reached decade-long lows, the economy may 
have been in crisis.  
O2. If annual inflation is greater than 10 per cent, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O3. If annual GDP growth is stagnant or negative, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O4. If opinion polls find the public regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
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O5. If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been 
in crisis. 
O6. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O7. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O8. If both domestic and international organizations (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) monitoring economic performance regarded 
the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in crisis. 
O9. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O10. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis 
management approach, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
As space permits only the briefest review of the material examined, we concentrate on 
the most likely macro-economic crises identified.  
 
The United States of America 
Here we examine three possible macro-economic crises. 
According to the OECD (1962: 5) by the late 1950s America was suffering 
from relatively high unemployment, and a large deficit.  Time stated that the economy 
was in recession.1  The rate of unemployment stood at 5.5 per cent, or 3.7 million.2  
For the Labor Department, anything above 3 million indicated economic weakness.3  
Inflation was at 1.5 per cent in 1959 and 1.3 per cent in 1960, while GDP growth fell 
from 7.2 per cent to 2.4 per cent in 1960 (Mitchell, 1998).  ‘By 1960 economists 
argued that the economy was slumping dangerously’ (Heath, 1975: 63).  The 
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Secretary of the Treasury admitted as much at an IMF meeting.4  Democratic 
presidential candidate Kennedy observed that in 1959 America experienced the lowest 
growth of any major industrialized country.5  ‘You don’t see a burgeoning economy,’ 
agreed his Republican rival Nixon.6  However, these factors were not sufficient to 
constitute an economic crisis. 
 For the OECD (1982: 9) the Carter administration’s final year was 
characterized by high interest rates, and rising unemployment.  Compounding matters, 
the National Bureau of Economic Research declared the economy in recession.7  
When the President invoked the Credit Control Act it resulted in reduced borrowing, 
and a steep decline in growth.8  By 1979, inflation stood at 11.3 per cent, rising to 
13.5 per cent in 1980, while GDP growth struggled at 2.4 per cent in 1979, before 
slumping to -0.3 per cent by 1980 (Mitchell, 1998).  By the second half of 1980 the 
administration’s responses to the recession smacked of crisis-management.  Carter’s 
Economic Renewal Programme to stimulate the economy was highly criticized.9  By 
November Fed Chairman Volcker admitted there was a recession.10  In restraining the 
growth of the money supply the Fed pushed interest rates to their highest levels in a 
century, reducing consumer borrowing, and sending spending into decline.11  
‘Through the actions of the Reserve Board and the administration, the economy was 
inadvertently plunged into the kind of recession the White House had been trying to 
avoid’ (Dark, 1999: 120).  
 By 1992 the economy was in serious trouble (Caple, 1991: 3).  In December 
1990 Fed Chairman Greenspan called the downturn “meaningful.”12  The OECD 
(1993: 18-29) showed that the economy shrank 1.2 per cent in 1991, while the budget 
deficit reached $290 billion in 1992, with federal debt surpassed $4 trillion.  Inflation 
ran at 2.9 per cent in 1991 and 1992, while GDP growth was -0.9 per cent in 1991, 
 11 
before rising to 2.7 per cent in 1992 (Mitchell, 1998).  The Wall Street Journal 
warned that the deficit was out of control,13 leaving no room to stimulate the 
economy.14  The Gulf War, the Savings & Loan bailout, defence-industry contraction, 
real estate depression, and soaring welfare payments, wreaked havoc with budget-
balancing efforts.15  Unemployment peaked at 7.8 per cent in mid-1992.  President 
Bush admitted that his administration had botched the recession.16  This economic 
downturn became the longest recession since the Great Depression.17     
 
Sweden 
Here we examine two potential macro-economic crises.  
The recession that began in the mid 1970s proved persistent.  The OECD 
(1982: 49) described the economy in 1982 as in difficulty.  Government’s 
expenditures had grown, while revenues stagnated.  The budget deficits were financed 
by international borrowing (Siven, 1984: 17), and as a consequence the debt to GNP 
ratio increased by over 250 per cent in six years.  In 1981 inflation reached 12.1 per 
cent, while GDP growth fell to -0.6 per cent.18  Unemployment reached 3.1 per cent in 
1982, its highest level since 1945, a political scandal in a country accustomed to full 
employment.19  However, economists believed unemployment would have been 
closer to 16 per cent if it included the jobless in training programmes, workers forced 
into early retirement, and those who had given up looking for work.20  The New York 
Times argued that the Swedish economy had been hobbled by foreign debt, low 
investment, and an adverse balance of payments.21  The economy was in crisis.   
 Although prosperity returned during the 1980s, by the 1990s, Sweden was 
suffering further economic malaise.  Attempts to maintain industrial competitiveness, 
an enormous public sector, and full employment, resulted in spiralling inflation.22  
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The Bank of International Settlement observed that Sweden’s 10.5 per cent inflation 
rate was the worst of the ten leading industrialised countries.23  In 1990 prices rose by 
6.6 per cent, against the OECD (1992: 12) average of 4.5 per cent.  GDP contracted 
by 1.1 per cent in 1991, and 1.4 per cent in 1992 (Mitchell, 1993).  That autumn the 
real estate market collapsed, putting the banking system in jeopardy,24 and threatening 
the country's financial infrastructure (Martin, 2000: 246).  Unemployment increased 
from 1.7 per cent in 199025 to 5.3 per cent in 1992.  The current budget deficit, public 
sector borrowing requirement, and national debt, all rose as the economy contracted.26  
The Guardian stated that ‘this was the first time the [Swedish] economy contracted 
since 1942.’27  “Sweden is in a very severe recession.  There is crisis in every part of 
the public sector,” said Anders Aslund, Sweden’s leading economist.28   
 
Insert Table 1 about here  
 
Of the five potential macro-economic crises, four constituted authentic crises, 
satisfying all, or nearly all, of the observable implications.  As can be seen in Table 1, 
America 1959-1961 satisfied only one observable implication, and thus could not be a 
severe economic low point.  The next section will examine the four macro-economic 
crises to see if ideational change occurred at these times, and, central to our 
hypothesis, if policy change followed ideational change.  
 
 
Section 3.2 Identification of Ideational and Policy Change 
 
A crisis presents new problems, as previous policies are discredited due to their 
implication in, or inability to right, the situation (Levy, 1994).  Economic crises can 
have great impact, shaping a range of alternatives, but they will not determine policy 
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choices.  These remain ‘firmly centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ 
(Golob, 2003: 375).  Ideas are crucial in determining policy choices due to uncertainty 
over the basic workings of the macro-economy, the difficulties of interpreting policy 
effectiveness, and the lack of agreement over what constitutes “correct” macro-
economic policy (McNamara, 1998: 57).  When an economic model is in flux, 
windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) will appear in which change agents will 
contest the viability of the prevailing paradigm.  They will present a range of new 
ideas to replace the ones upon which existing policy is based.  Thus, ideas influence 
policy by acting though particular actors (Berman, 1998: 22).  Consequently, we 
contend that significant policy change is dependent upon change agents reaching a 
broad consensus upon, and subsequently consolidating around, one particular set of 
new ideas.  These ideas will determine the path of subsequent policy, as policy 
makers work within a framework of ideas and standards that specify not only the 
goals of policy, but the instruments to be used to achieve these goals, and the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing (Hall, 1993: 279). 
The period of flux outlined above is similar to Blyth’s ‘discursive phase,’ 
where ‘agents interested in reforming existing distributional arrangements contest the 
definition, meaning and solution to the problems identified by opposing economic 
ideologies’ (1997: 234).  It is also analogous to what Oliver and Pemberton (2004: 
419) describe as the ‘institutional battle.’  ‘Economic ideas facilitate the reduction 
of…barriers by acting as coalition-building resources among agents who attempt to 
resolve the crisis’ (Blyth, 2002: 37).  Thus, ideas are the casual mechanisms of change 
in any critical juncture (Golob, 2003). 
Once agents coalesce around a set ideas, which purport to offer a solution to 
current economic woes, and an alternative to the current paradigm, they will attempt 
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to ‘inject’ these into the policy domain.  We contend that there are three groupings of 
change agents.  The most important agents are what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political 
entrepreneurs.’  Political entrepreneurs, according to Sheingate (2003: 188-190), 
‘exploit moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a new policy, 
a new agency, or new forms of collective action.’  They are similar to Kingdon’s 
(1995) broader concept of policy entrepreneurs, which constitute our second group of 
change agents.  Policy entrepreneurs encompass civil servants, technocrats, 
academics, economists and interest groups etc., who engage in policy innovation, and 
have access to decision makers.  However, Sheingate (2003) highlights the role of 
political leaders as political entrepreneurs: in times of crisis, ‘uncertainty makes 
possible the speculative, entrepreneurial quality of everyday politics…as politicians 
engage in a steady search for political advantage’ (2003: 192).  Thus, in a crisis, a 
political leader, usually an opposition leader, will introduce new economic policy 
ideas to rectify the ills of the existing paradigm.  Policy entrepreneurs are generally 
responsible for producing the ideas, but it is the political entrepreneur who acts as a 
figurehead, introducing these ideas into the policy process.  As Margaret Thatcher 
quipped to Ralph Harris of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), when he claimed 
the IEA had been advocating market reform twenty years before her time, ‘Ralph, the 
cock may crow but it’s the hen that lays the egg.’29  The triumph of a new idea 
depends upon ‘a workable new idea being available’ which change agents are 
prepared to adopt, and promote (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004: 419).  The final group 
of change agents are outside influences, encompassing the media, and international 
organizations, such as the OECD.  They will critique an existing economic paradigm, 
advocating a new set of economic ideas as an alternative.  These three broad 
groupings are similar to those identified by Pemberton in his schema of policy 
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learning (2000: 777).  He notes that while minor policy changes emanate from 
administrators, significant changes are dominated by academics, economists, interest 
groups, the media, and in particular politicians. 
Greener (2001: 134) sees an important role for exogenous shocks in securing 
the triumph of a new policy paradigm.  However, we hypothesize that a macro-
economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for change in macro-
economic policy.  Instead, a macro-economic crisis will result in debate regarding the 
economy, and the generation of new ideas.  The consolidation of agents around a set 
of new ideas is crucial for policy change.  This corresponds to McNamara’s (1998: 4-
5) argument that actors utilize new ideas to chart new policy strategy.  Consequently, 
the following observable implications seek to identify the generation of new 
economic ideas by agents.  
 
Ideational Change  
O1. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject new ideas into the policy 
arena is evident. 
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose alternative 
economic ideas – at election time their platform will be built around these alternative 
ideas. 
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, consumer 
groups etc. critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s (1989: 12) coalition-centred 
approach.  
O4. A clear set of alternative economic ideas, as developed by policy entrepreneurs, 
are evident. 
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O5. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests etc. 
O6. External or international organizations critique the current model and/or actively 
disseminate alternative economic ideas to replace this model. 
O7. The media questions the efficacy of the current economic model and/or specific 
policy areas. 
 
Should a broad range of agents agree that the prevailing paradigm is inadequate, and 
should be replaced, the first stage of Legro’s (2000: 419) model of rapid ideational 
change, collapse, will have occurred.  However, ‘even when ideational collapse 
occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement could still produce continuity, as 
society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000: 424).  Walsh (2006: 
494) sees this as the continued implementation of failed policies due to a lack of 
coherent intellectual links between policy tools and desired outcomes.   
Thus, in the wake of ideational collapse, the issue is reaching consensus on a 
new set of ideas.  If consensus is achieved it constitutes the second stage of Legro’s 
model – consolidation – agents co-ordinating a replacement set of ideas to the 
reigning consensus.  This can be seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating their 
innovations’ by combining a mixture of interests to produce a winning coalition 
(Sheingate 2003: 192-193). 
Extant ideas constitute the “armour” protecting policies.  The greater the level 
of consensus encompassing an idea the heavier the armour protecting the policies 
derived from it.  Armoured policies represent continuity, whereby once a policy has 
become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only in terms of 
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these ideas’ (Blyth, 2001: 4).  Referring to policies as armoured is similar to Golob’s 
notion of ‘policy frontiers’ (2003: 363).   
However, with the replacement of old ideas the policies based upon them will 
have lost their armour protection.  Pemberton (2000: 790) argues that new ideas 
change the wider policy environment.  Thus, we hypothesize that once there is 
consolidation around a new set of ideas, a significant change in policy should follow.  
In this regard ideational change will constitute the “differentiating factor” between 
crises that result in radical policy change, and those that do not.  Therefore, we must 
discover if radical changes in economic policy follows ideational change.  Thus, we 
have opted to base our final set of observable implications upon the concepts of first, 
second, and third order changes in policy developed by Hall (1993).  Hall (1993: 291) 
argued that policy failures and exogenous shocks can set off processes that lead to 
ideational change, to the extent of resulting in the re-examination of the belief systems 
through which policy has been generated – a paradigmatic (third order) policy change.  
These observables will enable us identify, and differentiate, both normal and 
fundamental shifts in a country’s macro-economic policies.  However, the observables 
set out here also incorporate the ideas of swift and enduring change developed by 
Hogan (2005).  As we are dealing with the idea of radical change we assume that this 
is not a long process, otherwise it would constitute incremental change.  Also, if the 
change is to be enduring in a policy environment full of competing actors, policy 
entrepreneurs, and policies in search of a home, it should survive for at least one 
change of government.  Otherwise, the new policies will have proven themselves 
lacking armoured protection (i.e. institutional embedding) necessary to see them 
endure.  As we are searching for the paradigm shift in macro-economic policy this 
must encompass all three of the below observables.  
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Policy Change  
O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly; for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly; for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly; for longer 
than one government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in 
government economic policy.  
 
America 1979-1981  
By the end of Carter’s administration the US economy was in trouble.  Paul Volcker, 
Federal Reserve Chairman, believed the remedy for spiralling inflation was a 
tightened money supply (Krugman, 1990), the first coherent move towards monetarist 
policy.  However, the results were limited.  The president’s imposition of new 
controls on consumer credit contributed to the economy’s slide.  Consequently, there 
was widespread dissatisfaction with, and critiques of, government policy. 
Time argued that Carter’s decisions resulted in reductions in consumer 
borrowing, and a steep decline in growth.30  ‘Recession Hits Hard’ headlined The 
Washington Post.31  Economic commentators were pessimistic on the prospects for 
recovery.  The economy was in what Walter Okun called ‘the great stagflation 
swamp.’32  The President’s inflation record is not good admitted Walter Heller.  In 
allowing the economy deteriorate, noted Alan Greenspan, Carter was forced into a 
crash programme of restraint leading to a huge rise in unemployment.33  The critiques 
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began to coalesce around a set of alternative economic ideas purporting to tackle 
current economic ills: monetarism.  With agents in agreement on the inadequacy of 
the extant paradigm, ideational collapse had occurred.    
 Monetarist concepts had been present in American political circles since the 
early 1970s, with Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas, and Arthur Laffer, founding 
organizations such as the American Enterprise Institute (Blyth, 1997: 236-237).  
These groups ensured that by the late 1970s American economic journalism 
propagated their ideas (Blyth, 1997: 237), with the Wall Street Journal acting as both 
‘effective synthesizer and chief proselytizer for these…ideas’ (Blyth, 2002: 164).  In 
this respect both a clear set of alternative ideas and policy entrepreneurs were present. 
However, it was Ronald Regan, the Republican candidate for President, who 
embraced this new ideology, and adopted the role of political entrepreneur.  His 
message was lower taxes, reduced spending on social services, balanced budgets, and 
fewer governmental regulations.  He blamed the Democrats’ inflationary policies for 
stifling productivity, and bringing recession.  In late August, Reagan stated that 
President Carter had ‘created a severe depression.’34  He promised new policies and 
leadership (Wayne, 1992: 182).  During the final stages of the election Reagan 
declared Carter’s record on inflation and unemployment ‘a failure on a scale so vast, 
in dimensions so broad, with effects so devastating, that it is virtually without 
parallel.’35  Regan forged an electoral coalition around the notion of monetarism 
(Blyth, 1997), and won the election on the back of having a discernable set of 
alternative economic ideas which could replace existing arrangements.  For the OECD 
(1982: 10) President Reagan’s election, and the accompanying Congressional 
election, was a clear mandate for conservative policies.  Consequently, in the wake of 
an economic crisis, and with the paradigm underlying extant economic policy 
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collapsed, change agents reached consensus, and consolidated around, a new 
economic orthodoxy.  Monetarism’s wide acceptance as a viable alternative idea 
constituted ideational change.  Thus, with the ideas fundamental to existing policy 
replaced, those policies were no longer armoured, and were easily changed. 
The new administration’s economic policies were very different from those of 
its predecessors in their political roots, and theoretical foundations (OECD, 1982: 9).  
Reagan fashioned his economic strategy around the monetarist proposals of Arthur 
Laffer.  To combat stagflation he promoted a painless panacea: tax cuts, and 
deregulation, wherein the resulting stimulus would boost federal revenues to balance 
the budget, reducing inflationary pressure.  The new President’s programme, dubbed 
Reaganomics, constituted the belief that American capitalism, freed from the burden 
of taxes and regulation, would surge ahead.  Reagan’s first budget proposed a $750 
billion tax cut over three years (Jones, 1995: 597).  The administration also cut $11 
billion from public works and job training programmes, unemployment benefits 
programmes, and trade adjustment assistance-benefits.36  According to the OECD 
(1982: 24) ‘a trend towards reduced economic regulation was carried further by the 
immediate application of the remaining stages of crude oil price decontrol, and the 
abolition of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.’ 
 In political terms Reagan capitalised on anti-government sentiment, 
emphasising individualism, and a smaller Federal role.  Tax relief was allied to a 
restructuring of federal expenditure, bringing sharp changes in the fiscal influence on 
the economy.  Economic policy instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and 
the goals behind economic policy, all changed.  This third order change (paradigm 
shift) in macro-economic policy endured into the administration of Reagan’s 
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successor.  D’Souza (1997: 85) argues that Reagan’s programme for America was the 
most ambitious since the New Deal.  
An economic crisis led to the collapse of the ideas underlying existing macro-
economic policy.  Policy and political entrepreneurs advocated a replacement set of 
ideas, namely monetarism.  Consolidation around this new economic orthodoxy was 
achieved with the coming of Roland Reagan.  Following his election there was a third 
order change (paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy.  Thus, we have a macro-
economic crisis, ideational change, and a radical change in macro-economic policy, 
which according to our overarching hypothesis constituting a critical juncture in 
macro-economic policy.  
 
America 1990-1992 
The Bush administration was blamed for the recession of the early 1990s.  The Gulf 
War, along with a range of domestic economic problems left a legacy of disastrous 
budget deficits.37  With national debt exceeding $4 trillion, and huge interest 
repayments, artificially stimulating the economy was not an option.38   
The public lost faith in the administration’s ability to manage the economy.  
An August 1992 poll by Time showed only 22 per cent of the public regarded 
President Bush as performing a good job.39  A Newsweek poll the following month 
produced similar results.40  Time argued that the Reagan/Bush administrations were 
largely responsible for the red ink on the federal budget.  The New York Times stated 
that from the start Bush had mismanaged the economy.41  However, when new taxes 
were levied, vicious criticism ensued.  ‘Read My Lips: I Lied’ proclaimed a New York 
Post headline.42  ‘Anxious about the economic future?’ asked Newsweek, ‘if you 
aren’t you should be,’ it warned.43  Even the World Bank attacked Bush’s economic 
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management.  ‘The most important lesson of elementary economics America must 
learn,’ said World Bank chief executive Laurence Summers, ‘is: deficit finance is not 
an alternate to cutting spending or raising taxes.’44  Confidence in extant economic 
ideas had collapsed. 
The 1992 Democrat Presidential nominee, Bill Clinton, attacked the 
administration for the economy’s ills.  Clinton pledged an activist government 
addressing the economy, jobs, and health care.  His campaign focused on the 
recession, with the famous maxim: ‘The Economy Stupid!’45  Although critiques of 
Bush’s administration were rife, unlike the previous example, these debates did not 
coalesce around an alternative set of economic ideas.  Clinton merely repackaged the 
existing economic ideas.  Consequently, there were no alternative ideas for agents to 
consolidate around.  The result was continuity with the old economic orthodoxy.  
Clinton was elected on the back of Bush’s unpopularity, with economic proposals 
aimed at rectifying Bush’s errors, rather than changing economic policy.  The ideas he 
espoused did not constitute an alternative economic paradigm, nor were any 
significant change agents present.  Consequently, Clinton came to power without any 
radically new economic ideas to inject into the policy arena.    
Nevertheless, he was determined to revive the economy.  Consequently, there 
was some change in the government’s economic policies.  Clinton (1992: 46) argued 
for a new economic programme putting people back to work.  Seeking to shed the 
Democratic Party’s reputation for ultra-liberalism, and wasteful spending, he sought 
to court the middle class, and blue-collar voters, who had once composed the party’s 
backbone.  But, in so doing he would fail to bring about a third order change 
(paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy.   
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The recession shaped much of Clinton’s agenda.  The OECD (1993: 14) 
argued that his administration’s economic strategy was built on the view that 
government could improve market outcomes, and had greater scope for correcting 
market failures.  ‘The zeal for deregulation has waned since the mid-1980s, and the 
government seems willing to turn to new regulation to achieve its social objectives in 
an environment of budgetary stringency’ (OECD, 1993: 117). 
Rejecting the ‘trickle down’ approach of the Reagan-Bush years, Clinton 
proposed the government revitalize the economy through investment in infrastructure 
and education (French, 1997: 52).  His 1993 economic programme proposed spending 
cuts and tax increases with a deficit reduction of $325 billion over four years.  One of 
the programmes main components was a $169 billion stimulus package.  In August, 
Congress passed a five-year economic plan incorporating Clinton’s spending cuts and 
tax increases, while gutting his stimulus package.  Nevertheless, the OECD (1993: 
113) argued that this deficit-reduction plan alleviated the fiscal imbalances.  
While the administration was committed to bringing down the deficit, to ease 
the drain on national savings, it also showed a willingness to counter rising income 
inequality, secure faster job creation, and support higher rates of investment in all 
forms.  Although economic policy instrument settings, and the instruments 
themselves, may have changed, the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy did 
not.  This constituted a second order change in macro-economic policy.   
The economic crisis witnessed the collapse of extant economic orthodoxy.  
However, change agents did not consolidate around a clear set of alternative 
economic ideas.  Consequently, the ideas underpinning the economic policies of the 
Regan/Bush years endured, providing them with a level of armoured protection 
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sufficient to deflect unconsolidated ideational attack.  There was no critical juncture 
in economic policy.   
 
Sweden 1980-1982 
The recession of the 1970s saw the budget deficits supporting the social welfare 
system deepen.  By 1981 the non-socialist coalition government held only 102 of the 
350 seats in the Riksdag.46  In autumn 1981 the krona was devalued by 10 per cent, 
and the following spring the government introduced far-reaching austerity measures.  
However, the opposition parties gained ground (Hadenius, 1997: 129-130).  The 
government hoped its attempts to combat the economy’s problems would generate 
respect for non-socialist policies, instead they generated widespread critiques, and 
initiated a debate on the economy.  The Financial Times pointed out that the Swedes 
were nervous about the future, but reluctant to see the welfare state’s benefits 
reduced.47  “The welfare state is in a crisis of legitimacy,’ observed Hans Vetterberg, 
Sweden’s leading public opinion analyst.  ‘We can no longer afford to keep 
expanding it.”48  Not surprisingly, the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) was 
unhappy with the government.  However, the non-socialist government wanted 
neither to raise taxes, nor dismantle the welfare state.49  This situation, rife with 
unfulfilled economic expectations, and agents dissatisfied with the prevailing 
paradigm, constituted ideational collapse. 
 The 1982 election was deemed crucial as it would determine whether public 
perception had shifted, as in Norway and Denmark, away from the Social Democrats.  
The election campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis – a $10 billion debt 
to foreign banks, inflation, declining exports, and increasing unemployment.50  During 
the campaign the Social Democrats attacked the viability of another non-socialist 
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government, and their economic policies.  The party presented a program on how 
Sweden could save and work its way out of crisis.  Ultimately, the election, and the 
debates surrounding it, failed to generate either a coherent set of alternative economic 
ideas to replace the existing ones, or a significant agent of change.  The non-socialist 
parties failed to create a coalition around ideas alternative to the welfare state, and 
nearly all economic ideas presented were variations on existing themes.  So, despite 
the failure of the dominant orthodoxy, change agents failed to reach consensus on a 
replacement set of ideas.  With failure to consolidate around a new ideational 
orthodoxy agents reflexively re-embraced the old.  In lieu of alternatives, the ideas 
underpinning the policies of the welfare state endured.  Consequently, the SAP won 
the election, not on the back of a new economic paradigm that could cure the 
country’s economic woes, but on a series of proposals to rectify existing economic 
arrangements. 
The result precipitated an altered approach to economic management, with 
minor changes in economic policies.  The SAP, admitting there were no ready 
solutions to the economy’s problems,51 implemented a recovery programme – The 
Third Road.  This approach argued that renewed growth required redistribution of 
income from labour to capital.  It constituted a shift in SAP economic planning, 
behind which course lay the influence of its research unit, as opposed to those of the 
unions.  This marked an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy, which other 
countries were rolling back (Martin, 2000: 234).  The Third Road sought to devise a 
wide-ranging stabilization programme encompassing demand management measures, 
as well as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure an equitable distribution 
of the burden of adjustment (OECD, 1984: 21).  The SAP was also determined to 
pour funds into job creating industries.52 
 26 
 The centrepiece of finance minister Feldt’s strategy to boost corporate profits 
was devaluation of the krona.  This measure was implemented in conjunction with a 
price freeze, and increases in sales and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan”53 
aimed at stimulating the economy.54  According to the OECD (1984: 21) the objective 
was to achieve export led, investment driven, recovery.  The Landsorganisationen i 
Sverige (LO) accommodated devaluation by demanding average wage increases of 
2.5 per cent in the ensuing wage-bargaining round.  The devaluation and international 
economic recovery resulted in high earnings and excellent scope for export expansion 
(Ahlén, 1989: 333).  The government also restored welfare entitlements cut by the 
non-socialists (OECD, 1984: 23).   
 To maintain the welfare state by whatever means necessary the government 
prioritized private sector growth, profits, and market forces.  In this case, the 
economic policy instrument settings changed, but the instruments of economic policy, 
and the goals behind economic policy, remained much the same – the maintenance of 
the welfare state.  This constituted a first order policy change.   
The economic crisis in Sweden generated significant debate, and a form of 
ideational collapse occurred.  However, change agents did not consolidate around a 
replacement economic orthodoxy.  As a result, the extant economic paradigm 
endured, providing the existing economic policies with sufficient armoured protection 
to remain largely intact. There was no critical juncture in economic policy. 
 
Sweden 1990-1992 
Sweden’s economic crisis in the early 1990s provided a window of opportunity for 
monetarist ideas to gain salience.  Following the SAP’s election in 1982, a number of 
agents began coalescing around alternative economic ideas, specifically monetarism.  
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The SAF created, Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS), and Timbro, 
disseminated monetarist ideas, which gained ground, especially among influential 
economists such as Assar Lindbeck (Blyth 2002: 214-15).  Political and policy 
entrepreneurs, consisting of the leaderships of the Conservative and Liberal parties, 
the policy elites outside the original social bargain, the SNS and SAF, began 
aggressively propagating these ideas (Blyth, 1997: 239). 
Meanwhile, the media continued to harangue the SAP government, and its 
policy failures.  The New York Times stated that the economy was stagnant.55  The 
Financial Times pointed out that in 1991, under the impact of weak foreign demand, 
and losses in competitiveness, Swedish exporters lost ground internationally.56  The 
Washington Post argued that Swedes were troubled by the country’s slow growth, and 
doubts about their ability to maintain the standard of living to which they were 
accustomed.57   
Once the economy entered freefall, critiques of the SAP by the media, the 
opposition, and the OECD, enabled change agents to propose monetarism as an 
alternative economic paradigm.  In an environment of unfulfilled collective economic 
expectations, contestation of the existing economic orthodoxy by agents, agreed on 
both its inadequacy and need for replacement, resulted in its collapse.  From the mid-
1980s onwards the SAF, among others, had increasingly called into question the 
corporatist system (de Geer, 1992: 155-157).  The SAF took on the role of a vigorous 
policy entrepreneur, mounting intense publicity campaigns to improve the electoral 
prospects of the Liberal and Conservative parties.  The SAF’s ideas on privatization, 
and deregulation, also influenced the SAP government.  To combat the crisis, the 
SAP, prior to the 1991 election, began incorporating monetarist ideas into policy.  In 
1990 currency outflows prompted the Riksbank to increase interest rates.58  To reduce 
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inflation, the government tightened fiscal policy (OECD, 1992: 11), a significant 
change in macro-economic policy for an SAP government that previously attached 
top priority to the maintenance of high employment.  As the economy depended on 
tight fiscal and monetary policies this meant giving highest priority to keeping 
inflation at the European level, even at the cost of unemployment, something 
previously unacceptable.59  The January 1991 budget highlighted the consolidation of 
monetarist ideas, as low inflation became the objective of economic policy (OECD, 
1992: 39). 
The internationalization of financial markets restricted the ability of the 
government to pursue economic policies diverging from those of other capitalist 
states, forming a ‘cognitive lock’ (Blyth, 2002).  Policies disapproved of by 
industrialists (and foreign currency dealers) became increasingly difficult to 
implement (Marshall, 1996: 9).   
The 1991 election saw the opposition parties reach consensus around 
monetarist ideas, a coherent set of alternative economic theories to rectify the 
economy.  Following the election, Carl Bildt, leader of the Moderate Party, formed a 
four-party government advocating a switch to monetarism.  The Financial Times 
observed that ‘Swedish politics have reached the end of the Social Democratic era.’60  
Bildt summed up the result as ‘‘a massive mandate for change.’’61  Thus, following 
an economic crisis a range of agents consolidated around a new set of economic ideas 
to replace those that had collapsed.  As the orthodoxy underpinning existing policies 
was replaced, these polices lost the ideational armour that had protected them from 
change.  Sweden had accepted the idea of an alternative economic paradigm.  
The coalition government sought to fundamentally change the economy’s 
structure.  To right the economy it slashed the role of the state,62 selling its shares in 
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34 companies,63 with a value of SKr250 billion.64  In limiting how far state 
responsibility should extend, Carl Bidlt challenged the conventional wisdom since the 
1930s.65  According to the OECD (1992: 44) a central element of the new economic 
programme was reduced taxes, matched to reduced spending, to encourage efficiency.  
Competitive forces were given a greater role in allocating resources in the economy 
(OECD, 1992: 40).  The new administration reduced the benefit system, and began 
abolishing the employee investment funds,66 using their resources to support the 
development of companies (Hadenius, 1997: 153).  This change reflected concerns 
that past policies, especially the expansion of the public sector, involved high costs in 
lost economic dynamism, and had undermined Sweden’s growth prospects.  In 
seeking to change Sweden from social democracy to a more free market economy this 
government achieved more in its first six weeks in office than any pervious non-
socialist administration.67   
An economic crisis led to the collapse of the dominant economic orthodoxy.  
The SAF, acting as a policy entrepreneur, introduced alternative monetarist economic 
ideas, around which consensus developed, leading to their consolidation.  Following 
the SAP’s electoral defeat advocates of monetarism set about changing the setting, 
instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind economic policy, constituting a third order 
change (paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy.  This change in macro-economic 
policy, proceeded by both macro-economic crisis, and ideational change, constituted a 
critical juncture. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here  
 
Insert Table 3 about here  
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Of the four macro-economic crises examined, two (America 1979-1981; Sweden 
1990-1992) witnessed third order changes (paradigm shifts) in macro-economic 
policy.  We can see from the case studies that these third order policy changes 
occurred following the collapse of the dominant economic orthodoxies, the 
introduction of new ideas into the policy arenas, and the subsequent consolidation of 
change agents around these ideas.  The other two macro-economic crises (Sweden 
1980-1982; America 1990-1992) did not witness third order changes in macro-
economic policy.  Although ideational collapse occurred in both cases, change agents 
did not consolidate around replacement economic orthodoxies.  Consequently, the 
hierarchy of goals behind existing macro-economic policy did not change. 
These findings validate our hypothesis.  Namely, a critical juncture in macro-
economic policy consists of three stages: macro-economic crisis, ideational change, 
and radical policy change.  The findings show that a macro-economic crisis is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for there to be a paradigm shift in macro-
economic policy.  A macro-economic crisis not followed by ideational change, will at 
most, lead to a first or second order macro-economic policy change (Sweden 1980-
1982; America 1990-1992).  Whereas, a macro-economic crisis followed by 
ideational change (collapse and consolidation) will witness a third order change 
(paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy (America 1979-1981; Sweden 1990-
1992).   
Thus, when examining the degree of macro-economic policy change in the 
wake of a macro-economic crisis, ideas occupy a central, and yet dichotomous, 
position.  The extant ideational orthodoxy provides the armour protecting existing 
macro-economic policy, ensuring its continuity.  However, should ideational collapse 
occur, then the existing macro-economic policy is no longer armoured.  If change 
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agents manage to subsequently consolidate around a new set of economic ideas the 
result will be ideational change, and a third order change in macro-economic policy.  
However, if these agents fail to consolidate around a new economic orthodoxy, extant 
ideas will endure, ensuring a first, or second, order policy change at most.  Therefore, 
ideational change clearly constitutes the “differentiating factor" between an economic 
crisis that leads to a paradigm shift in macro-economic policy, and one that does not.   
 
Conclusion 
As political science is continuously seeking better tools with which to make sense of 
change, any new, or revised, instrument should be eagerly welcomed.  This paper 
sought to develop an improved framework, incorporating an a priori element, for 
examining critical junctures.  We hypothesised that a critical juncture in macro-
economic policy consisted of: macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and radical 
policy change.  Of the case studies examined America 1979-1981 and Sweden 1990-
1992 fulfilled all three stages.  In both cases the ideational foundations of existing 
macro-economic policy collapsed in the wake of economic crises, and were replaced 
as change agents consolidated around new economic orthodoxies.  Third order macro-
economic policy change, paradigm shift, followed ideational change.  America 1959-
1961 was merely an economic downturn, but Sweden 1980-1982, and America 1990-
1992, both constituted economic crises.  While ideational collapse occurred in both 
cases, change agents did not consolidate around viable alternative ideas, and in the 
absence of ideational change, there was only minor macro-economic policy change.     
 We conclude that during a macro-economic crisis, ideational change is the key 
component leading to third order change in macro-economic policy.  Established 
policies, and the armoured protection afforded by their underpinning ideas, having 
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been brought into question by previous failures, are liable to be overcome by change 
agents consolidating around new ideas (America 1979-1981; Sweden 1990-1992).  In 
the absence of ideational change the level of policy change, in response to a macro-
economic crisis, will be either of the first or second order, but not the third.  Thus, 
economic policy instrument settings, and the instruments themselves may change, but 
without ideational change the hierarchy of goals underpinning macro-economic policy 
will remain unaltered (Sweden 1980-1982; America 1990-1992).  Ideational change 
constitutes the “differentiating factor” between those macro-economic crises that are 
followed by a third order change (paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy, and 
those that are not.  Following a macro-economic crisis the presence, or absence, of 
ideational change should enable us predict if there will be a third order change in 
macro-economic policy, and consequently a critical juncture.    
 This paper draws upon crisis, ideational, and institutional literature, to forge a 
rigorous framework capable not only of analysing macro-economic policy change, but 
other policy change also.  The framework, with some minor modification, could be 
utilised to predict policy outcomes in such divergent fields as foreign policy, 
democratization, gender mainstreaming, as well as social and/or environmental 
policy. By testing the framework in these policy areas, it should either validate and 
improve the framework, or falsify it. By incorporating a predictive element – the 
differentiating factor – into the concept of critical junctures the framework breaks new 
ground.  Thus researchers, having identified a crisis (of whatever kind), and ideational 
change, should be able to predict that a third order policy change, a paradigm shift, is 
coming, or if it has taken place, that the event constitutes a critical juncture.  
Researchers will no longer have to wait years to be able to declare an event a critical 
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juncture.  The predictive element broadens the applicability of the concept, deepens 
its incisiveness, and contributes to a better understanding of policy change. 
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